With RSA and Norton having their own solutions, we know have 5 big players in the arena (see Gartner 2011). This is a good proof that the correlation market is growing and that the solutions are getting mature.

The conclusion is that it is pretty weak, whereas I thought it was on pair with true ALSR (as advertised). Very instructive.

I shamelessly decided to reuse and extend her mind-map style diagram from a system security centric view into something more generic and operational on IT security.

Then, I came with this first version of the diagram:

A the moment it is probably quite incomplete and incoherent on some aspects, but I am quite satisfied of the shape it is taking. I will certainly update it quite often, as soon as I think about something new.

I find it convenient as a memo summarizing goals, steps and tools to achieve security. It may also help clarifying some points during a presentation.

Feel free to use it (as long as you keep the credit to this website). I am waiting for your comments and suggestions on how to improve it.

I have recently worked on network virtualization. Many people, especially the network guys, have been recently excited with the VMware Vswitch or Cisco Nexus stuff.  It is something that I understand because virtualization is cool. It brings many convenient features that truly make the life easier.

But what about the security? Convenience and security rarely come together, right? Oh, wait… we are in 2011, so lessons must have been learned. After all, Mr Salesman swear that it is more secure than ever. Convenience and security packed together, he says… it sounds promising. Let’s dig a little to find out what they won’t tell you…

I will focus on what really changes with virtualization : the architecture. One of the main goals of the technology is to reduce the number of physical devices to cut the costs, save space and energy. Of course, it goes with a simplification of the physical architecture. Therefore, some features previously handled by dedicated physical devices are now handled logically by a unique piece of hardware.

This obviously goes against the security best practices about designing network architectures with various degrees of exposure. But has the technology evolved so much that we should reconsider these recommendations?

VMware Vswitches or Nexus 1000V

These technologies are similar in the sense that they are designed to work directly inside the VMware platform. Vswitches are integrated with the solution of VMware, while Nexus benefits from the experience of Cisco and bring more layer 2 control (more settings, more protocols).

As well on the architecture documents of VMware as within the administration interface of Vcenter, it appears so easy to create segregated switches and build this way in a few clicks a DMZ architecture:

But it is slightly different in reality, as Brad Hedlund from Cisco shows in an interesting article: the vswitch illusion and DMZ virtualization. In short, whether you are using VMware Vswitches or Nexus 1000V, a single threaded program runs all the configured virtual switches. In clear, all the virtual switches share the same memory space. So, any vulnerability in the code would compromise all the switches, in other words: the entire network. And, not a surprise here, there have been many vulnerabilities. Just browse a CVE database if you want to check.

So you don’t want to rely on such a design for your datacenter, right?

Nexus 7000

In the case of the Nexus 7000, it is a little bit different because most of the switching work is handled by specific hardware, which have a much smaller attack surface than the vswitches stuff. But is it really safe?

The Nexus family is quite new and from what I could witness, they are quite pushy selling that. Because it is new, there is still neither much info surrounding the technologies used, nor user feedback, nor security research. Anyway, below is a quick sum-up of what I could find.

A few words about the architecture

In a layer 3 Nexus architecture, Nexus 2000, 5000 and 7000 are designed to work together. Nexus 2000 are basically top-of-the-rack port panels, with no intelligence. Nexus 5000 takes care of most of the layer 2 switching, while Nexus 7000 adds layer 2 functionalities and layer 3 support. Nexus 2000 and 5000 can work without the 7000, but in that case there is not so much difference with a classic layer 2 switch in terms of security (but it has the advantage to be more flexible to integrate in a datacenter). This and this may help you to visualize the differences.

So we will focus on the Nexus 7000 architecture, which bring VDC as a way to handle DMZ architectures. VDC are somehow similar to VLANs. But whereas VLANs virtualized LANs on a switch, VDC virtualize switches. So, on the same Nexus 5000 device, VDC will add the capacity to have multiple virtual switches which are in theory properly isolated.

This is a very basic sum-up for what we are interested in, but if you want to learn more, I encourage you to read the Cisco whitepaper about VDCs.

The flaws

Now that the presentations are made, the downside…

George Hedfors is the only researcher that worked notably on this platform, as far as I am aware. He made some really great findings, that you can discover within his slides.
At the time of his work – 2010, it appeared that the NX-OS consisted of a Linux Kernel 2.6.10 (released in 2004!). We can imagine that the OS has been signifiantly customized and hardened by Cisco. They may have include NX-bit support  (included since 2.6.8 and later improved). However, there is probably no ALSR support (2.6.12), no MAC system (SELinux or Tomoyo). Of course, I may be wrong but I haven’t found any documentation about that and my Cisco contact did not provide me with any consistent detail.

Anyway, he found a bunch of design flaws:

• Poor CLI design: there are 686 hidden commands (system, debugging) that can be launched as root (sudo without password). One of these command is gdb, which can start a network daemon as root. The attacker can then connect to the socket to attach to any process on the system to elevate his privileges. Of course, it requires some shell access, so the exposure is limited. However, it is very instructive of how the system was designed!
• Insecure daemon configuration: Daemon are not chrooted and run with the root user.
• Embarassing CDP vulnerability : a vulnerability from 2001 was reintroduced in the code handling CDP. So it is possible to crash a daemon running as root. What if another vulnerability on a layer 2 daemon (vtp, hsrp, stp…) was discovered and allowed to rewrite the stack? Game over, the attacker is root.
• Strange hidden account : there is a ftpuser hidden account with a dumb password (nbv123). Secret backdoor? I don’t know, but anyway it is not serious at all and should have been revealed by any consistent audit.
• Shell design flaw: the VSH shell accepts a parameter (-a) that allow to spawn any command over the security roles normaly in place.
• You can also get a root shell by simply spawning ssh `/bin/bash` from the CLI.

To any serious security guy or unix administrator, these should look like amateurism. And what’s the hell are all the security audits for?

So concerning the Nexus 7000, it is obvious that at best it is not specifically designed to be secure, at worst it was simply as poorly designed (or released too quickly) as most stuff.

Conclusion

In conclusion, one thing we can tell for sure is that none of the virtualized networking solutions are designed to be secure. Of course, all these flaws are hopefully already or will be soon fixed. But, despite what Cisco may claim, the facts are here: there is no VDC miracle. The Nexus platform is certainly great, but not more bug-free, flaw-free than any other piece of code.
No virtualized architecture can give the same degree of protection than physical segregation.

In the case of Vswitches or Nexus 1000, the attack surface is just too high to use it for DMZ segregation if you are serious about security. The vulnerabilities are already here and it will be feasible for a skillful and motivated attacker to own your datacenter.

Concerning the Nexus 7000 and its VDC, the attack surface is considerably reduced because there is less code and fewer protocols at layer 2. However, it is undoubtly less secure than physical segregation. Any zero-day vulnerability would potentially expose the datacenter (and we all know that some zero-day sometimes take years before coming to the public, which is a lot of time for the criminals or the government agencies to exploit it). You can’t take it lightly when it comes to the whole datacenter integrity and it doesn’t make sense if you have expensive (in cash or in labor hours) security at upper layers.

But, of course, it may depend on what you have to protect. If your datacenter hosts sensitive data for your company’s buisiness, then you should think twice on how you deploy virtualization or use the cloud.

Don’t get me wrong. These technologies are great and very useful. In many areas, there are an improvement. Simply, they must be used with as much care as always. Concerning the DMZ topic, as far as I am concerned, I will not rely on virtualization and keep physical segregation between zones, supported by different devices from different makers.

One thing I keep an eye on, though, is the development of virtualized firewalls, IPS, etc. In a few years, if these technologies should became really mature (enforcing segregation on all OSI layers) and the hosting OS security should really improved, most of the concerns here would be addressed.

Sadly, so far, there is even not the beginning of a replacement solution. Passwords will be there for long, so we would better use them accordingly.

Yes, I am aware of many on-line services like FisrtPass, KeePass, 1stPassword, etc. However, I don’t feel comfortable with having all my password somewhere on-line, even if they claim – and I believe they are sincere, that they use strong encryption and can’t access to it.

Instead, I use a combination of the Firefox password manager and the Pwgen add-on. I use this add-on to quickly and conveniently generate a random password when I subscribe to a web service. When Firefox prompts for it, I just choose to remember the password automatically. SSO quick and dirty.

For the other passwords that I can’t and don’t need to memorize, I store them in a local encrypted file.

To edit the file, I simply use Vim with this nice GPG plugin:

• copy gpg.vim to /home/$user/.vim/plugin
• if not done yet, generate you GPG key :

   $ gpg --gen-key

• Encrypt your password file and erase it:

  $ gpg --encrypt --recipient 'your name' passwords
  $ rm passwords

• Now, it’s done. Just edit password.gpg to decrypt and access to your passwords (you will be prompted for your passphrase):

  $ vim passwords.gpg

If you don’t like the overhead of GPG, a more straightforward solution is to use the OpenSSL extension :

• Copy the openssl.vim file to /home/$user/.vim/plugin as well.

• Now, to encrypt to file to, say, AES (note the .aes file extension which makes sense for the plugin):

  $ openssl aes-256-cbc -in passwords -out passwords.aes

• Decryption will occur as soon as you edit the file with Vim:

  $ vim passwords.aes

I believe that, if not perfect, it is pretty secure. I mean not more, not less than your system is. Anyway I don’t have any need for an on-line manager. And you, how do you manage your passwords? Let us know about your tips.

Here is the report for more details.

Code and explanations are on the ESFS project homepage.
Beyond the pratical usage, I wonder if it can offer anyhow better resistance to statistical analysis that usually defeat stenography. The author addresses partialy the point on the mailing list:

What I meant with hide is that, since it uses the LSBs, you can pick
any image, and “find data” in them, so it makes it a little bit harder
to know where you actually have data, and if you really do.

To this, a reader named stormrider pointed out an interesting research document (PDF), which is a state of the art of the limitations of stenography and the attacks against it. Is it really a dead-end ?

This is indeed a very interesting field of research.

The attacks are well explained. I personally knew about Slowloris but didn’t about RUDY and post attacks.

It shows and allows to configure the global settings, but also, and this is the most interesting part, indicated for each process running if it supports those security measures. It is even able to enforce the protections for each application which would not support it natively (i.e. not set at compilation time).

Hacking: the next generation

The purpose of this book is to give to the readers an overview of the most common attacks nowadays. It covers all fields : social engineering, web attacks, networking, etc.
It was easy to read : the authors are straight to the point and their sentences are clear.

I especially appreciated their state of art about XSS and CSRF attacks. It is certainly the best I have read so far, greatly illustrated with exciting and real case studies.

On the other hand,  I quickly passed over the networking stuff (both wired and wireless). It was too basic and didn’t show anything new – maybe it is because I specialize in those fields.

Anyway, globally, I strongly recommend this book. It is worth while your money if you want to know more on web attacks or to have a good overview of modern threats.

Beautiful Security

This is a collection of essays by some of the best security experts and hackers.

Well, I won’t go around, I have been quite disappointed by this book. The overall lacks coherence and after a while you start wondering what this book is trying to demonstrate. At the end, there is a crual lack of connection between the essays and it globally makes it appear very confusing.

It also sometimes lacks technical references and the writing style is too verbose, too literal for a technical book to be attractive.

There are however some good essays, like one about PGP (by Philip Zimmermann himself, though). It is hard to find some good and complete documentation about it, and this essay is definitely a good one, which I will probably read again when I feel the need of it.

But I wouldn’t recommend this book only for this short piece of writing. Lack of cohesion, too much litterature and not enough technical stuff actually bored me, though that’s just my personal taste.